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Abstract
Psychology considered as a natural science began as Aristotelian “physics” or “natural philosophy” of the soul.
C. Wolff placed psychology under metaphysics, coordinate with cosmology. Scottish thinkers placed it within
moral philosophy, but distinguished its “physical” laws from properly moral laws (for guiding conduct).
Several Germans sought to establish an autonomous empirical Psychology as a branch of natural science.
British and French visual theorists developed mathematically precise theories of size and distance perception;
they created instruments to test these theories and to measure visual phenomena such as the duration of visual
impressions. These investigators typically were dualists who included mental phenomena within nature.
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              Let us agree that "psychology" may be defined as the science of the mind,
         and that this science studies a domain of phenomena that includes sense per-
         ception, imagination, memory, understanding or reasoning, feeling, and will.1
         If we then interpret the term "natural science" as it was understood in the
         early modern period, psychology considered as a natural science already had a
         long history as the eighteenth century began.  The prescribed domain of
         subject-matter was investigated by Aristotle under the name "logon peri tes
         psyches," of which it formed a proper part.  This Aristotelian discipline was
         widely studied and taught in the early modern period under the title of "de
         anima," or, with increasing frequency, "psychologia."2  Aristotelian textbooks
         of philosophy placed the study of the soul, including the rational soul and
         intellect, under the rubric of physics or natural science, together with the
         study of basic physical principles, body in general, and the heavens.3
         _________________________
         *Revised version of a paper from the conference on La Psychologie et ses
         fronti‘eres du XIXe si‘ecle ‘a nos jours, Centre Henri Pi’eron, Universit’e Ren’e
         Descartes (June, 1993).
         1.  "Psychology" was so defined in major textbooks into the 1920s: George
         Trumbull Ladd, _P_s_y_c_h_o_l_o_g_y, _D_e_s_c_r_i_p_t_i_v_e _a_n_d _E_x_p_l_a_n_a_t_o_r_y, New York, 1895, p.
         1-2; William James _P_s_y_c_h_o_l_o_g_y, Briefer Course, New York, 1892, p. 1; Harvey
         A. Carr, _P_s_y_c_h_o_l_o_g_y: _A _S_t_u_d_y _o_f _M_e_n_t_a_l _A_c_t_i_v_i_t_y, New York/London, 1925, p.
         1.  Also, Theodule Ribot, _L_a _P_s_y_c_h_o_l_o_g_i_e _a_n_g_l_a_i_s_e _c_o_n_t_e_m_p_o_r_a_i_n_e, 3d ed.,
         Paris, 1896, p. 42.
         2.  Otto Casmann, _P_s_y_c_h_o_l_o_g_i_a _a_n_t_h_r_o_p_o_l_o_g_i_a, _s_i_v_e _a_n_i_m_a_e _h_u_m_a_n_a_e _d_o_c_t_r_i_n_a,
         Hannover, 1594; Rudolph Goclenius, _P_s_y_c_h_o_l_o_g_i_a: _h_o_c _e_s_t, _d_e _h_o_m_i_n_i_s _p_e_r_f_e_c-
         _t_i_o_n_e, _a_n_i_m_o, Marburgh, 1594; Fortunio Liceti, _P_s_y_c_h_o_l_o_g_i_a _a_n_t_h_r_o_p_i_n_e, _s_i_v_e
         _d_e _o_r_t_u _a_n_i_m_a_e _h_u_m_a_n_a_e, Frankfurt am Main, 1606.
         3.  Pierre Barbay, _I_n _u_n_i_v_e_r_s_a_m _A_r_i_s_t_o_t_e_l_i_s _p_h_i_l_o_s_o_p_h_i_a_m _i_n_t_r_o_d_u_c_t_i_o, 6th
         ed., Paris, 1700, ’Compendii physici,’ pt. 2, tr. 2, a. 3; Franco Burgers-
         dijck, _C_o_l_l_e_g_i_u_m _p_h_y_s_i_c_u_m, _d_i_s_p_u_t_a_t_i_o_n_i_b_u_s _X_X_X_I_I, Oxford, 1664, disp. 20-31;
         Eustace of St. Paul, _S_u_m_m_a _p_h_i_l_o_s_o_p_h_i_a_e _q_u_a_d_r_i_p_a_r_t_i_t_a, K"oln, 1638, pt. 3,
         ‘Physica’, tr. 3, disp. 3-4, p. 228-308.  The Aristotelian concept of _s_o_u_l
         (_p_s_y_c_h_e, _a_n_i_m_a) extends to vegetative and nutritive, as well as sensory and
         intellectual, powers and capacities.
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         Although the "new philosophers" of the seventeenth century uniformly rejected
         (in their various ways) the Aristotelian theory of the soul as the substantial
         form of the body, they did not always deviate from the Aristotelian conception
         of physics as the science of nature in general, including the human mind.  As
         the eighteenth century opened, then, it was an academic commonplace that the
         science of the mind or soul belongs to physics or the science of nature.
              Eighteenth-century writers made many proposals for changing or newly
         founding the study of the human mind.  A few contended that the study of the
         mind could not be made sufficiently rigorous to rank as a science.4  The most
         famous was Kant, though he nonetheless put empirical psychology under the
         rubric of physics (_p_h_y_s_i_o_l_o_g_i_a) and remained committed to the applicability of
         the law of cause to all psychological phenomena.5  But a large number of
         authors, British, Swiss, and especially German, proposed and sought to prac-
         tice an "experimental"--that is, an "empirical" and "observational"--"science
         of the mind," a scientific psychology.  This activity was surveyed by F. A.
         Carus in his _G_e_s_c_h_i_c_h_t_e _d_e_r _P_s_y_c_h_o_l_o_g_i_e of 1808, in which he discussed more
         than 125 eighteenth-century authors, mostly German, but also British, French,
         Swiss, Italian, Spanish, and Swedish, who wrote psychological works of some
         type, the majority placing psychology under the rubric of natural science.6
              This description of psychology in the seventeenth and eighteenth centu-
         ries contradicts the received historiography.  Recent general histories of
         _________________________
         4.  Julius B. von Rohr, _U_n_t_e_r_r_i_c_h_t _v_o_n _d_e_r _K_u_n_s_t, _d_e_r _m_e_n_s_c_h_e_n _G_e_m"_u_t_h_e_r _z_u
         _e_r_f_o_r_s_c_h_e_n, Leipzig, 1721; Charles de Secondat, baron de Montesquieu, _D_e
         _l’_e_s_p_r_i_t _d_e_s _l_o_i_x, Geneva, 1748, bk. I, ch. 1, p. 3-5.
         5.  Hatfield, "Empirical, Rational, and Transcendental Psychology: Psycholo-
         gy as Science and as Philosophy," in Paul Guyer, ed., _C_a_m_b_r_i_d_g_e _C_o_m_p_a_n_i_o_n _t_o
         _K_a_n_t, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992, p. 200-227.
         6.  Friedrich A. Carus, _G_e_s_c_h_i_c_h_t_e _d_e_r _P_s_y_c_h_o_l_o_g_i_e, Leipzig, 1808, p. 522-
         760.  A century later, Max Dessoir stressed the prominence of psychology in
         the eighteenth century, _G_e_s_c_h_i_c_h_t_e _d_e_r _n_e_u_e_r_e_n _d_e_u_t_s_c_h_e_n _P_s_y_c_h_o_l_o_g_i_e, 2d
         ed., Berlin, 1897-1902, p. 358.
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         psychology agree that natural-scientific psychology arose only in the second
         half of the nineteenth century.7  Some historians, taking their cue from this
         historiography, have sought to explain why psychology did not arise in the
         previous centuries.8  Only a few recent studies treat the earlier calls for a
         "natural scientific" psychology as anything but empty rhetoric.9  And I have
         found no recent author who acknowledges that psychology was considered a
         natural science as the eighteenth century opened and that it had been so con-
         sidered in Europe for several centuries.
              The contradiction between my description of eighteenth-century psychology
         and the traditional historiography arises partly from differing understandings
         of the concepts _p_s_y_c_h_o_l_o_g_y and _n_a_t_u_r_a_l _s_c_i_e_n_c_e.  In the past half-century
         there has been a decided tendency to equate "natural scientific psychology"
         with "quantitative, experimental psychology," and to contrast the "scientific"
         character of this psychology with the "metaphysical" character of its earlier
         namesake.  This tendency is not surprising: the growth of psychology as a
         scientific discipline has been built on its claim to apply quantitative exper-
         imental rigor to subject-matters about which philosophers and metaphysicians
         only talked and speculated.  If one equates modern science with quantitative
         _________________________
         7.  Edwin G. Boring, _H_i_s_t_o_r_y _o_f _E_x_p_e_r_i_m_e_n_t_a_l _P_s_y_c_h_o_l_o_g_y, 2d ed., New York,
         Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1950; Duane P. Shultz and Sydney Ellen Schultz,
         _H_i_s_t_o_r_y _o_f _M_o_d_e_r_n _P_s_y_c_h_o_l_o_g_y, San Diego, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1987;
         Richard Lowry, _E_v_o_l_u_t_i_o_n _o_f _P_s_y_c_h_o_l_o_g_i_c_a_l _T_h_e_o_r_y, 2d ed., New York, Aldine
         Publishing Co., 1982; Daniel N. Robinson, _I_n_t_e_l_l_e_c_t_u_a_l _H_i_s_t_o_r_y _o_f _P_s_y_c_h_o_l_o-
         _g_y, rev. ed., New York, Macmillan Publishing Co., 1981.
         8.  E.g., Graham Richards, "The Absence of Psychology in the Eighteenth Cen-
         tury: A Linguistic Perspective," _S_t_u_d_i_e_s _i_n _H_i_s_t_o_r_y _a_n_d _P_h_i_l_o_s_o_p_h_y _o_f _S_c_i-
         _e_n_c_e, _2_3, 1992, p. 195-211.
         9.  Christopher Fox, "Defining Eighteenth-Century Psychology: Some Problems
         and Perspectives," in Fox, ed., _P_s_y_c_h_o_l_o_g_y _a_n_d _L_i_t_e_r_a_t_u_r_e _i_n _t_h_e _E_i_g_h_t_e_e_n_t_h
         _C_e_n_t_u_r_y, New York, AMS Press, 1987, p. 1-22; Rolf Jeschonnek, introduction
         to the reprint edition of Carus’s _G_e_s_c_h_i_c_h_t_e, Berlin/New York, Springer Ver-
         lag, 1990, p. 17-37; Eckart Scheerer, "Psychologie," in  Joachim Ritter,
         ed., _H_i_s_t_o_r_i_s_c_h_e_s _W"_o_r_t_e_r_b_u_c_h _d_e_r _P_h_i_l_o_s_o_p_h_i_e, Basel, Schwabe, 1971-, vol. 7,
         col. 1599-1653; Fernando Vidal, "Psychology in the 18th Century," _H_i_s_t_o_r_y _o_f
         _t_h_e _H_u_m_a_n _S_c_i_e_n_c_e_s, _6, 1993, p. 89-119.
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         science, then there could be no scientific psychology prior to the widespread
         adoption of quantitative experimental techniques in the period after 1850.  If
         one confines modern science to its non-metaphysical moments, then metaphysi-
         cally inclined theorists and experimentalists must be excluded, or else only a
         "sanitized" version of their work allowed in.  These two constraints on legi-
         timacy conjointly explain why the great body of eighteenth-century literature
         claiming to found a natural scientific psychology has been largely ignored by
         historians of psychology.
              The equation of natural science with anti-metaphysical, quantitative
         experimentation is problematic on two counts.  As an approach to history, it
         partakes of the worst failings of "presentist" and "Whig" history: it ignores
         the self-understanding of earlier figures who considered themselves practi-
         tioners of natural science, and it redescribes their cognitive activity and
         intellectual products from the standpoint of the presently ruling party, in
         this case, the community of experimental psychologists and their historians
         and apologists.  Philosophically, it makes a crude positivist assumption that
         all progress in science is progress in the quantitative description of natural
         phenomena.  This philosophical position should be resisted: not all natural
         scientific achievements are fundamentally quantitative, including achievements
         in two sciences that are closely related to psychology, viz., physiology and
         biology (consider the discovery of neurons, or the early development of the
         theory of evolution).  Moreover, in the early history of physics an important
         role was played by conceptual innovation as opposed to quantitative prediction
         or modeling, as exemplified in Descartes’ contribution to the development of
         the concept of a unified celestial and terrestrial physics, (metaphysically)
         grounded on a small set of basic concepts, laws, and patterns of explana-
         tion.10  One should not rule out the possibility that in psychology, too,
         _________________________
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         important conceptual work preceded quantitative experimentation.
         A Contextualist Approach to the Origin of "Natural Scientific" Psychology
              During the eighteenth century, as in the seventeenth, "psychology" was
         the science of mind or soul, or of mental phenomena; as such, it was known
         under many names, deriving from "psyche," "anima," "soul," "mind," and their
         cognates.
11
  Mind and soul were often, but not always, equated.  The mind or
         soul was considered by many to be a natural being, a thing in nature.12  "Sci-
         ence" was applied to any systematic body of thought, and need not have con-
         noted an empirical basis.  "Natural science" was equated with "physics," in
         the etymological sense of that term; it was the science of nature.13  In the
         seventeenth and throughout much of the eighteenth centuries this science
         included the whole of nature, comprising a subject-matter that we would now
         range under the headings of physics, physical astronomy, chemistry, biology,
         physiology, and psychology.
         _________________________
         10.  I. B. Cohen, _N_e_w_t_o_n_i_a_n _R_e_v_o_l_u_t_i_o_n, Cambridge, Cambridge University
         Press, 1980, p. 182-9; Hatfield, "Metaphysics and the New Science," in David
         Lindberg and Robert Westman, eds., _R_e_a_p_p_r_a_i_s_a_l_s _o_f _t_h_e _S_c_i_e_n_t_i_f_i_c _R_e_v_o_l_u-
         _t_i_o_n, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1990, p. 93-166.
         11.  Many historical investigations, including Vidal’s helpful "Psychology
         in the Encyclopedias," have focused on the origin of the word "psychology,"
         as opposed to the origin of psychology as a discipline.  But the aetiology
         of concepts must be distinguished from the (allied) histories of word usage.
         The science of the mind was known under many titles in the eighteenth centu-
         ry, including "the science of the mind," "the theory of mind," "psychology,"
         "psychologie," "Psychologie," and "Seelenlehre."  Related disciplines in-
         cluded "anthropology," or the "science of Man," differing instances of which
         paid greater or lesser attention to human mental life, and "pneumatics,"
         "pneumatology," or "Geisterlehre," which considered spirits (immaterial be-
         ings).
         12.  Even a Cartesian could include the study of the soul under the rubric
         of "physics": Antoine Le Grand, _I_n_s_t_i_t_u_t_i_o _p_h_i_l_o_s_o_p_h_i_a_e _s_e_c_u_n_d_u_m _p_r_i_n_c_i_p_i_a
         _d_e _R_e_n_a_t_i _D_e_s_c_a_r_t_e_s, London, 1678, praecognoscenda, a. 7, 15, 16.
         13.  For eighteenth century definitions (explicit and implicit) of the terms
         marked by quotation in this paragraph, see Ephraim Chambers, _C_y_c_l_o_p_a_e_d_i_a, _o_r
         _A_n _U_n_i_v_e_r_s_a_l _D_i_c_t_i_o_n_a_r_y _o_f _A_r_t_s _a_n_d _S_c_i_e_n_c_e_s, 2d ed., London, 1738, 2 vols.;
         Immanuel Kant, _K_r_i_t_i_k _d_e_r _r_e_i_n_e_n _V_e_r_n_u_n_f_t, Riga, 1781/1787, Methodenlehre,
         pt. 3 (Kant uses the Latin term "physiologia" for the science of nature).
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              Given these understandings of the terms and the areas of study they
         denote, psychology was considered by a great many eighteenth century authors
         to be a science.  This was so whether psychology was treated as a science of
         mental phenomena or of mental substance.  Many considered it to be a natural
         science based on experience, including those who considered themselves to be
         studying an immaterial substance.  A minority of the latter group followed
         Christian Wolff in placing psychology under the rubric of metaphysics rather
         than physics.  This fact, however, requires careful interpretation, for Wolff
         also placed cosmology (general physics, including planetary astronomy and the
         laws of motion) under metaphysics, and he allowed that metaphysical principles
         could and should be established empirically.14  Thus, if one takes
         eighteenth-century conceptions of psychology seriously across the board, as I
         intend to do, one is committed to allowing immaterial substances as a (puta-
         tive) object of empirical study.
              This last observation, even cushioned as it is by the surrounding contex-
         tualist historical methodology, is likely to shock modern sensibilities.  This
         shock is another manifestation of our use of present standards (and mytholo-
         gies) to judge past materials.  Immaterial substances are not in the list of
         likely theoretical posits in current psychology and physiology.  One way of
         interpreting this fact is to think that such posits were part of a religious
         world view that was overcome with the Enlightenment rejection of superstition
         and authority.  "Reason," so the story often goes, has shown us that dualism
         and other mind-positing ontologies are empty or incoherent.
         _________________________
         14.  Christian Wolff, _P_h_i_l_o_s_o_p_h_i_a _r_a_t_i_o_n_a_l_i_s _s_i_v_e _l_o_g_i_c_a, 3d ed., Frankfurt
         am Main/Leipzig, 1740: philosophical cognition requires "historical" cogni-
         tion of facts (#50) and metaphysics is a species of philosophy (#79).
         Further, psychology is a part of metaphysics, and it requires cognition of
         facts from experience in both its empirical and rational branches: _P_s_y_c_h_o_l_o-
         _g_i_a _e_m_p_i_r_i_c_a, new ed., Frankfurt am Main/Leipzig, 1738, ##1-4.
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              This way of understanding the Enlightenment and the dictates of reason is
         itself unreflective and simplistic.  It is true that some Enlightenment "phi-
         losophes" are justly portrayed as rejecting God and the soul on rational
         grounds, in opposition to tradition and authority.  But one should not leap to
         the converse conclusion, for it is not true that all those who posited imma-
         terial substances were blind followers of tradition and authority.  Indeed, a
         chief characteristic of many who were metaphysical realists about the soul was
         their appeal to reason or intellect in establishing their ontologies: Des-
         cartes is the most notorious example.  In any event, if one believes that
         immaterial entities exist and that some of them inhabit human bodies, it makes
         good sense to seek to determine the powers and capacities of such substances
         empirically, by studying the manifestation of the mind in the behavior of oth-
         ers and in one’s own experience of mental phenomena.  From this point of view,
         taking an empirical approach to immaterial substances is an extremely rational
         undertaking.  How else is one to determine their powers?15
              When viewed contextually, psychology as a natural science was not
         invented in the nineteenth or even the eighteenth century; but during the
         eighteenth century it was altered from its seventeenth century form.  As the
         eighteenth century opened the science of the mind included several dimensions:
         _________________________
         15.  Aristotelians also quite reasonably took an empirical attitude toward
         to the powers of the soul, considered as an animating principle.  A similar
         point might be made about the study of an immaterial supreme being; hence,
         the extensive practice of "natural theology" during the eighteenth century.
         There is a tension between characterizations of the Enlightenment as "The
         Age of Reason" and as anti-clerical and secular.  "Enlightenment" has two
         distinct connotations, one based on cognitive attitude or "method," another
         on content and conclusion.  According to the first, it means "thinking for
         one’s self," to the second, it includes rejection of the immaterial beings
         posited in many religions.  Tension arises because supreme rationalists such
         as Descartes and Leibniz "thought for themselves" and claimed to establish
         the existence of God and the soul through reason.  This apparent conflict
         should, I think, serve to sensitize us to the changing content assigned to
         reason or "the rational" in the modern period.
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         charting the "faculties"--the capacities and powers--of mind was foremost, but
         there also were metaphysical questions about the ontology of the mind and its
         faculties, and about their relation to body and to specific bodily organs,
         especially the brain.  As the century proceeded, the study of the mind was
         displaced from its subdisciplinary status in the Aristotelian curriculum and
         pursued along several lines, including explicitly Christian apologetical
         approaches to the soul, and the diametrically opposed materialism of the phi-
         losophes and their Scottish counterparts--including Diderot, d’Holbach, Hel-
         vetius, Priestley, and Bentham--which has received the most attention in his-
         tories of Enlightenment psychology, as part of the usual story of the Enlight-
         enment banishment of spirits and the alliance of materialism with progressive
         thought and politics.16  Between these two extremes lay the largest and
         richest body of literature, that of the manifold programs for adopting an
         empirical approach to mind and its relation to body.  Such programs were pur-
         sued in various disciplinary matrices, including the newly founded and widely
         influential Wolffian matrix in Germany; the "science of the mind" allied with
         Scottish moral philosophy; the proposal of a "natural history" of mind (and of
         Man) by the prominent Swiss naturalist Charles Bonnet; and treatments of mind
         in the established contexts of medical physiology and the theory of vision.
         The faculty-based approach dominated the most prevalent form of dualistic
         psychology, the avowedly non-metaphysical "_E_h_r_f_a_h_r_u_n_g_s_s_e_e_l_e_n_l_e_h_r_e."  An alter-
         native to faculty psychology began to be widely discussed in the middle of the
         eighteenth century: the associationist theory of mind propounded by Hartley,
         Hume, and others, which attempted to explain all or most phenomena of mind by
         appeal to a few laws of association (usually three).
         _________________________
         16.  Simon Schaffer, "States of Mind: Enlightenment and Natural Philosophy,"
         in G. S. Rousseau, _L_a_n_g_u_a_g_e_s _o_f _P_s_y_c_h_e, Berkeley University of California
         Press, 1990, p. 233-290.
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              A detailed road map through this diverse material cannot be attempted
         here; I aim instead to sketch the three most visible empirical approaches to
         the mind and to determine their self-ascribed disciplinary locations.  The
         three are: Wolffian psychology, Scottish sciences of Man, and German
         _E_h_r_f_a_h_r_u_n_g_s_s_e_e_l_e_n_l_e_h_r_e.
         The Wolffian Disciplinary Context for Psychology
              Christian Wolff created the paired disciplines of empirical and rational
         psychology, which he ordered coordinately with ontology, cosmology, and
         natural theology under metaphysics.17  His efforts have been the butt of many
         jokes in the history of psychology, most notably of Wundt’s famous jest that
         Wolff’s rational psychology "contains about as much experience as the empiri-
         cal, and the empirical about as much metaphysics as the rational."18  In the
         standard historiography, Wolff is part of the metaphysical past of
         psychology’s prehistory.  His work is paradigmatic of the allegedly regressive
         tendencies of pre-scientific, speculative or metaphysical psychology: it is
         organized around the study of mental faculties, and it adopts a realistic
         attitude toward the soul considered as an immaterial substance.
              In the context of the eighteenth century, Wolffian empirical psychology
         was a progressive research program.  It was novel in both content and metho-
         dology.  Its major methodological innovation was the explicit enjoinder to
         adopt an empiricist attitude toward mental faculties and phenomena: they were
         to be studied by attending to their operations, while holding metaphysical
         speculation in abeyance.  The facts thus attained are then examined within
         rational psychology, in order to determine appropriate explanatory (we would
         _________________________
         17.  Wolff, _P_h_i_l_o_s_o_p_h_i_a _r_a_t_i_o_n_a_l_i_s, #79; see also Alexander Gottlieb
         Baumgarten, _M_e_t_a_p_h_y_s_i_c_a, 7th ed., Halle, 1779.
         18.  Wilhelm Wundt, _G_r_u_n_d_z"_u_g_e _d_e_r _p_h_y_s_i_o_l_o_g_i_s_c_h_e_n _P_s_y_c_h_o_l_o_g_i_e, 3d ed.,
         Leipzig, 1887, p. 7.
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         say "theoretical") principles19.  Within this scheme, the description of men-
         tal faculties is not intended to be _e_x_p_l_a_n_a_t_o_r_y (as was the dormitive virtue
         portrayed in Moliere’s joke), but _d_e_s_c_r_i_p_t_i_v_e of a unified capacity of the
         mind.  Such descriptions, being classificatory, are not atheoretical; but
         because they were not intended to be explanatory, they are not subject to
         Moliere’s joke (any more than are current psychological investigations of cog-
         nitive and perceptual capacities).20  Within his empiricist program, Wolff
         claimed that psychological states, and particularly those pertaining to pleas-
         ure and pain, are subject to quantitative measurement and mathematical laws,
         although he did not himself formulate a calculus of pleasure.  He also sug-
         gested that the goodness of one’s memory can be estimated by the temporal
         latency of response to a memory demand, from the number of tries it takes to
         retrieve from memory, and from the number of acts it takes to fix an item in
         memory.  He suggested a corresponding quantitative estimate for the size of
         memory.
21
              In content, the Wolffian psychology was noteworthy for its analysis and
         discussion of the faculties of imagination, attention, and reflection.  Wolff
         distinguished imagination proper, which simply reproduces sensory materials,
         from the faculty of "feigning" or producing new representations (_f_a_c_u_l_t_e
         _f_i_g_e_n_d_i).  He described the "law of imagination," a law of association through
         _________________________
         19.  Wolff, _P_s_y_c_h_o_l_o_g_i_a _e_m_p_i_r_i_c_a, ##1-4; _P_s_y_c_h_o_l_o_g_i_a _r_a_t_i_o_n_a_l_i_s, ##1-3.  For
         English translation and discussion, see Robert J. Richards, "Christian
         Wolff’s Prolegomena to Empirical and Rational Psychology: Translation and
         Commentary," _P_r_o_c_e_e_d_i_n_g_s _o_f _t_h_e _A_m_e_r_i_c_a_n _P_h_i_l_o_s_o_p_h_i_c_a_l _S_o_c_i_e_t_y, _1_2_4, 1980,
         p. 227-239.
         20.  Jerry Fodor jocularly defends faculty psychology in his _M_o_d_u_l_a_r_i_t_y _o_f
         _M_i_n_d, Cambridge, Mass., The MIT Press, 1983.  More seriously, the organiza-
         tion of psychology textbooks has long born the stamp of the traditional
         division of faculties, as psychologists have studied the functionally
         characterized faculties of cognition, including perception, learning, and
         memory, and more specific capacities, such as visual perception, and within
         vision, color, shape, and motion perception.
         21.  Wolff, _P_s_y_c_h_o_l_o_g_i_a _e_m_p_i_r_i_c_a, ##190-194.
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         simultaneity.  And he discussed attention and its subspecies, "reflection" (or
         attention to the content of one’s perceptions), including impediments to their
         exercise.22
              The Wolffian system was widely influential in Germany, where it displaced
         the fading Aristotelian and Cartesian school philosophies.  Numerous textbooks
         of Wolffian philosophy came off the presses, and they were used even by
         authors who no longer subscribed to their precepts, including Immanuel
         Kant.
23
  The system was also rendered into French by the Berlin Wolffian, Jean
         Deschamps.24
         Scottish Sciences of Man and Mind
              In the Scottish Universities of the first half of the eighteenth century
         the mind was studied in three areas of the revised Aristotelian curriculum:
         logic, metaphysics, and moral philosophy (which discussed appetite).  By mid
         century, a peculiarly Scottish phenomenon had occurred: within the university
         arts curriculum, the study of the mind in general became the special preserve
         of moral philosophy (as might be expected of the "moral sense" school).  Tho-
         mas Reid, professor of moral philosophy at Glasgow, transformed moral philoso-
         phy into the examination of the "powers" of the mind.  At Edinburgh, when Adam
         Ferguson became professor of moral philosophy and pneumatics in 1764, he
         answered to his title by making the "theory of mind" a proper part of his
         basic textbook, the _I_n_s_t_i_t_u_t_e_s _o_f _M_o_r_a_l _P_h_i_l_o_s_o_p_h_y.25
         _________________________
         22.  Wolff, _P_s_y_c_h_o_l_o_g_i_a _e_m_p_i_r_i_c_a, pt. 1, sec. 2, ch. 3-4; sec. 3, ch. 1;
         _P_s_y_c_h_o_l_o_g_i_a _r_a_t_i_o_n_a_l_i_s, pt. 1, sec. 1, ch. 3-4.
         23.  Among the many Wolffian textbooks, Kant is known to have taught from
         Baumgarten’s _M_e_t_a_p_h_y_s_i_c_a.
         24.  Jean Deschamps, _C_o_u_r_s _a_b_r’_e_g’_e _d_e _l_a _p_h_i_l_o_s_o_p_h_i_e _w_o_l_f_i_e_n_n_e,
         Leipzig/Amsterdam, 1743-47, 2 vols.
         25.  Thomas Reid, _O_n _t_h_e _A_c_t_i_v_e _P_o_w_e_r_s _o_f _M_a_n, Edinburgh, 1788.  Adam Fergu-
         son, _I_n_s_t_i_t_u_t_e_s _o_f _M_o_r_a_l _P_h_i_l_o_s_o_p_h_y, 2d ed., Edinburgh, 1773, pt. 2.
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              The fact that the study of the mind fell largely under moral philosophy
         in the Scottish arts curriculum does not imply that the mind was considered to
         be distinct from nature or from natural scientific methods of study and modes
         of explanation.  Indeed, it was characteristic of Scottish philosophers to
         adopt a naturalistic attitude toward the mind and its powers.  Hume signaled
         his naturalistic intentions in the subtitle to his _T_r_e_a_t_i_s_e _o_f _H_u_m_a_n _N_a_t_u_r_e:
         _B_e_i_n_g _a_n _A_t_t_e_m_p_t _t_o _I_n_t_r_o_d_u_c_e _t_h_e _E_x_p_e_r_i_m_e_n_t_a_l _M_e_t_h_o_d _o_f _R_e_a_s_o_n_i_n_g _i_n_t_o _M_o_r_a_l
         _S_u_b_j_e_c_t_s; in the introduction, he explicitly compared his methods and modes of
         explanation to those of Newton.26  Ferguson, in his telegraphic _I_n_s_t_i_t_u_t_e_s _o_f
         _M_o_r_a_l _P_h_i_l_o_s_o_p_h_y, formulated natural laws of both matter and mind, distin-
         guishing the latter from properly moral laws.  He defined moral philosophy as
         "the knowledge of what ought to be," and declared that "pneumatics, or the
         physical history of mind, is the foundation of moral philosophy."  The term
         "physical" is not used here to announce a physicalist or reductionist theory
         of mind; rather, it is used to mean "any general expression of a natural
         operation, as exemplified in a number of cases."  The natural laws of mind
         were named "physical" by Ferguson in order to contrast them with the moral
         laws that serve to guide conduct.27  Examples of the former "laws" include the
         facts that we are conscious of our "existence, operation, and will," and that
         perception takes place via media that do not resemble the object of percep-
         tion.28
         _E_h_r_f_a_h_r_u_n_g_s_s_e_e_l_e_n_l_e_h_r_e
         _________________________
         26.  London, 1739-40, 3 vols.  Besides Hume, Hartley, Reid, and Ferguson
         adopted "Newtonian" approaches to mind: Gladys Bryson, _M_a_n _a_n_d _S_o_c_i_e_t_y: _T_h_e
         _S_c_o_t_t_i_s_h _I_n_q_u_i_r_y _o_f _t_h_e _E_i_g_h_t_e_e_n_t_h _C_e_n_t_u_r_y, Princeton, Princeton University
         Press, 1945, p. 18-21, 138-139, 145.
         27.  Ferguson, _I_n_s_t_i_t_u_t_e_s, Intro., sec. 7; sec. 3.
         28.  _I_b_i_d., pt. 2, ch. 2, sec. 1.
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              While in the Scottish context investigators sought to make the mind an
         object of empirical investigation and to discover its "physical laws" as a
         prolegomena to morals, in Germany the science of the soul (or mind) was
         treated as an autonomous discipline--or as a subdiscipline of the science of
         Man--within the theoretical (as opposed to moral) sciences.  The framers of
         "Seelenlehre," "Ehrfahrungsseelenlehre," and "empirische Psychologie" aspired
         to such an empirical approach to the soul or mind.  Early instances are found
         in the work J. F. Abel and C. C. E. Schmid.  Abel and Schmid placed empirical
         psychology within natural science proper, distinct from metaphysics; they con-
         sidered psychology to be the branch of anthropology or _M_e_n_s_c_h_e_n_l_e_h_r_e that
         searches for the general laws of the mind and its relation to the body.29
              Abel’s book exhibits a typical psychological textbook organization, with
         roots in the _d_e _a_n_i_m_a tradition.  After brief preliminary methodological
         remarks, it considers first the nature of the mind, its basic powers and
         organs, and especially its relation to the brain, and then it surveys in sys-
         tematic fashion the chief faculties of mind: sense, imagination, attention,
         thought, feeling, and bodily motion.  Throughout, Abel attempts to show how
         all of the various powers and capacities of the mind can be reduced to one
         basic power, the power of representation, and how the materials on which the
         power of representation operates must all derive from sensory ideas aroused
         through stimulation of the sense organs.  As had become common in the
         eighteenth century, he showed an interest in quantitative measures where these
         were available; indeed, he gave quantitative values for the "briefest still
         perceivable duration" of an impression on the sense organs.  But the primary
         _________________________
         29.  Jacob F. Abel (Professor of Psychology and Morals at the Karlsschule),
         _E_i_n_l_e_i_t_u_n_g _i_n _d_i_e _S_e_e_l_e_n_l_e_h_r_e, Stuttgart, 1786, Einleitung; Karl C. E.
         Schmid (Professor of Philosophy, Jena), _E_m_p_i_r_i_s_c_h_e _P_s_y_c_h_o_l_o_g_i_e, 2d ed.,
         Jena, 1796, p. 8, 11-12.
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         theoretical interest of the work was the discovery of "laws" governing the
         various faculties, including laws of association and attention.30  The laws of
         attention assumed an all or none "conquest" (_s_i_e_g_e_n) of attention by one or
         another representation.  Originally, the currently liveliest or most pleasant
         representation wins out, but through experience it may happen that a less
         lively or pleasant representation that has in the past been followed by more
         pleasant representations will win out; the attentional faculty then comes to
         be guided by means-ends considerations in choosing which representations to
         enhance through its own power.
              Many of the topics in Abel’s textbook, such as the perception of size,
         shape, location, and distance, and attentional "conquest," can be found in
         nineteenth- and in early and late twentieth-century textbooks.  But one set of
         questions would no longer be found after ca. 1930: those pertaining to the
         existence and nature of the soul.  The framers of _S_e_e_l_e_n_l_e_h_r_e typically argued
         that the soul is a separate substance from the mind, and they did so on philo-
         sophical as opposed to religious grounds.  Abel repeated the widely used argu-
         ment that the unity of consciousness requires a unified substance as its vehi-
         cle; but body is essentially conglomerate; hence, the simple substance that is
         mind must be distinct from body.  He took this argument to be an example of
         empirical investigation.  He divorced his investigation from "metaphysical"
         considerations that transcend experience, e.g., about mind-body interaction.
         Historians of psychology typically lump together talk of a separate thinking
         substance and of mind-body interaction as "metaphysics."  Here, an
         eighteenth-century author asserts a different dividing point.  He holds that
         empirical considerations can be brought to bear on the the existence and
         nature of the soul.  He does not mean that one can simply introspect and
         _________________________
         30.  Abel, _S_e_e_l_e_n_l_e_h_r_e, ##148-163, 194-206.
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         discover the simple substance of the soul.  An argument is required: a
         theoretical structure must be fit to the "data" of inner sense.  But he con-
         sidered these questions on the soul to be empirically tractable, by contrast
         with the problem of mind-body interaction, which admits of multiple hypotheses
         that "save" the phenomena without differing empirically.  He excluded the
         latter, empirically-undecidable problem from his _S_e_e_l_e_n_l_e_h_r_e.31
              Schmid drew the boundaries of the empirical more narrowly than had Abel.
         He followed Kant in removing questions pertaining to the substantiality and
         simplicity of the soul from the domain of empirical investigation and relegat-
         ing them to "dogmatic" metaphysics--for which he reserved the names "transcen-
         dental" or "pure" psychology, or "pneumatology," thereby deviating from Kant’s
         terminology.  Included here were questions pertaining to the independence,
         simplicity, personhood, spirituality, immutability, and immortality of the
         soul, as well as those pertaining to its real causal relation to body.  He
         used the terms "empirical" and "rational" psychology as Wolff had, to denote
         disciplines that are based directly on experience (or are _a _p_o_s_t_e_r_i_o_r_i) and
         those that are based on the analysis of concepts that themselves are drawn
         from experience (and hence are "comparatively _a _p_r_i_o_r_i").32  The rational part
         of psychology constructs explanations for the empirical generalizations and
         other data collected in the empirical part.
              Having relegated the problem of the substantial nature of the mind to the
         domain of dogmatic metaphysics, Schmid adopted a position of "empirical dual-
         ism."33  Empirical dualism distinguishes soul and body on the grounds that the
         properties and phenomena revealed through outer and inner sense cannot be
         united under a single set of concepts.  Experience shows that the phenomena of
         _________________________
         31.  _I_b_i_d., ##4-20.
         32.  Schmid, _E_m_p_i_r_i_s_c_h_e _P_s_y_c_h_o_l_o_g_i_e, p. 18-26.
         33.  _I_b_i_d., p. 189-190.
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         each are lawfully related.  Empirical psychology charts lawful relations
         within the domain of soul, spirit, or mind, and between that domain and bodily
         processes.  Schmid’s work is particularly impressive for its detailed analyti-
         cal treatment of psychological concepts informed by a thorough acquaintance
         with the psychological, anthropological, and medical literatures.
         Empirically and Theoretically Progressive Research Programs
              According to the usual sociological measure of progressiveness, psychol-
         ogy was a progressive discipline during the eighteenth century: academic
         appointments in psychology were made, courses were taught, the number of text-
         books published per decade increased, and, near the end of the century, jour-
         nals were founded (even if they failed within a decade).34  But I would like
         to make a stronger claim for the progressiveness of various eighteenth century
         research programs that took a natural scientific attitude toward the mind or
         mental phenomena.  I propose as a working historical thesis that eighteenth-
         century work made a threefold contribution to the psychology of the nineteenth
         century.  First, eighteenth-century faculty psychology yielded a _c_o_n_c_e_p_t_u_a_l
         framework that was more fine-grained than that of earlier centuries, and that
         benefited nineteenth-century investigations.  Second, eighteenth century asso-
         ciation psychology provided the _t_h_e_o_r_e_t_i_c_a_l framework that dominated much
         nineteenth century psychology, the associationist framework.  Third,
         eighteenth century experimental work, especially in vision, provided a tradi-
         tion of _e_x_p_e_r_i_m_e_n_t_a_l practice that, although not often counted as part of
         "psychology" so called during the eighteenth century, was incorporated into
         the "new" experimental discipline of psychology during the nineteenth century.
         Further development of the long-standing tradition of experimental work on
         _________________________
         34.  These claims are supported by Carus’s _G_e_s_c_h_i_c_h_t_e and Schmid’s overview
         of the literature, _E_m_p_i_r_i_s_c_h_e _P_s_y_c_h_o_l_o_g_i_e, p. 142-156.
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         vision provided the primary foundation for the claims to found a new, experi-
         mental psychology.
              A survey of that subset of popular late nineteenth- and early twentieth-
         century psychology textbooks that treat psychology as a natural science would
         reveal that the structure of these books has much in common with scholastic
         textbooks of the seventeenth century: the external senses, their organs and
         associated nervous processes, are treated first; the "internal senses" (usu-
         ally not so called) are treated further on, including memory and imagination;
         higher cognitive faculties, including reasoning, further on; bodily motion,
         somewhere along the way; and appetite and will, near the end.35  We can dis-
         cover the specifically eighteenth-century contribution by finding those new
         chapters in these textbooks that have origins in that century.  The new
         chapters include those on attention, conception or abstraction, and associa-
         tion.  Attention was brought into psychology by the faculty tradition, partic-
         ularly by Wolff and his followers, and was further addressed in
         _E_h_r_f_a_h_r_u_n_g_s_s_e_e_l_e_n_l_e_h_r_e, which proposed empirical constraints on the scope and
         direction of attention.36  The chapters on discrimination and on conception or
         abstraction, though rooted in ancient Greek philosophy, were introduced into
         eighteenth-century psychology books by those developing the faculty
         approach.37  The added chapter on association was due largely to attempts by
         authors such as Hume and Hartley to make the laws of association the
         _________________________
         35.  James, _P_s_y_c_h_o_l_o_g_y; Edward B. Titchener, _O_u_t_l_i_n_e _o_f _P_s_y_c_h_o_l_o_g_y, new ed.,
         New York/London, 1901; Hermann Ebbinghaus, _A_b_r_i_s_s _d_e_r _P_s_y_c_h_o_l_o_g_i_e, 4th ed.,
         Leipzig, 1912; Edward L. Thorndike, _E_l_e_m_e_n_t_s _o_f _P_s_y_c_h_o_l_o_g_y, 2d ed., New
         York, 1915; Wilhelm Wundt, _G_r_u_n_d_r_i_s_s _d_e_r _P_s_y_c_h_o_l_o_g_i_e, 13th ed., Leipzig,
         1918; Carr, _P_s_y_c_h_o_l_o_g_y.
         36.  Wolff, _P_s_y_c_h_o_l_o_g_i_a _e_m_p_i_r_i_c_a, pt. 1, sec. 3, ch. 1.  Abel, _S_e_e_l_e_n_l_e_h_r_e,
         ##194-268.  Nicholas Malebranche previously had placed attention at the
         center of his discussion of method, _R_e_c_h_e_r_c_h_e _d_e _l_a _v’_e_r_i_t’_e, bk. 6, pt. 2, in
         his _O_e_u_v_r_e_s, Paris, 1958-1970, 20 vols., vol. 2.
         37.  Wolff, _P_s_y_c_h_o_l_o_g_i_a _e_m_p_i_r_i_c_a, pt. 1, sec. 3, ch. 1; _P_s_y_c_h_o_l_o_g_i_a _r_a-
         _t_i_o_n_a_l_i_s, pt. 1, sec. 1, ch. 4; Abel, _S_e_e_l_e_n_l_e_h_r_e, ##392-436.
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         fundamental explanatory principles of mind.38
              Thus far my analysis of the "progressive" tenor of eighteenth century
         psychology has been restricted to changes in psychological textbooks, which
         may or may not have claimed novel conceptual and theoretical results, and
         which only sometimes claimed to present original observations.  One might con-
         cede that this older tradition contributed conceptual materials to the text-
         books of the new psychology of the nineteenth century, without accepting that
         the eighteenth century contributed to the rise of experimental psychology.  In
         fact, the strongest eighteenth-century contribution to the rise of quantita-
         tive experimentation in psychology came from the mixed-mathematical science of
         optics.
              Optics was a "mathematical" science in virtue of its use of geometrical
         constructions, especially in the tracing of "visual rays."  As regards vision
         proper, these rays were used in the analysis of the perception of size, shape,
         distance, and motion.  Mathematical (geometrical) regularities, such as that
         among visual angle, apparent distance, and perceived size, were typically
         expressed as proportions.  There were few numerical values in optics (indices
         of refraction being one).  In the seventeenth century Descartes gave estimates
         of the range within which accommodation and convergence could provide accurate
         information for the perception of distance, though he did not say how he had
         arrived at the values.  Berkeley, who introduced a conceptual revolution into
         the theory of vision with his doctrine of suggestion, did not cite quantita-
         tive observational evidence.39  The eighteenth century was replete with novel
         _________________________
         38.  Hume, _T_r_e_a_t_i_s_e, bk. 1, pt. 1, sec. 4; David Hartley, _O_b_s_e_r_v_a_t_i_o_n_s _o_n
         _M_a_n, London, 1749, pt. 1, ch. 1, prop. 10-14, and passim.  Wolff described
         the phenomena of association and their law, _P_s_y_c_h_o_l_o_g_i_a _e_m_p_i_r_i_c_a, ##104,
         117; his follower Baumgarten named "_a_s_s_o_c_i_a_t_i_o _i_d_e_a_r_u_m" the "_l_e_x _i_m_a_g_i_n_a-
         _t_i_o_n_i_s," _M_e_t_a_p_h_y_s_i_c_a, #561.
         39.  On Descartes and Berkeley, see Gary Hatfield and William Epstein, "The
         Sensory Core and the Medieval Foundations of Early Modern Perceptual
         Theory," _I_s_i_s, _7_0, 1979, p. 363-384.
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         observations of sensory phenomena, including after-images and color blindness,
         that were not quantitative, but were nonetheless important for that.40
              Nonetheless, there were quantitative studies of visual perception in the
         eighteenth century, among which I give three examples.  Patrick D’Arcy meas-
         ured the persistence of visual impressions by devising an apparatus for
         presenting a luminous objects (a live coal) to an observer with a circular
         motion whose diameter, velocity, and distance from the observer could be
         varied.  By observing how rapidly the coal must turn in order to result in the
         perception of a closed circle with constantly fixed gaze, he concluded that
         the impression lasts for "8 tierces."41  Pierre Bouger examined the question
         of how lines must be rendered in perspective to yield an appearance of being
         parallel, which was problem addressed by several mathematical theorists.  He
         introduced into the problem the notion of the apparent (as opposed to real)
         inclination of the ground plane, and measured the latter.42  Robert Smith
         undertook a thorough study of the moon illusion, which he explained in accor-
         dance with the hypothesis that for a given visual angle, perceived size varies
         with apparent distance.  He contended that the moon appears larger at the hor-
         izon because it seems further away than when it is overhead.  In support of
         this hypothesis, he undertook to measure the perceived curvature of the vault
         of the heavens, which informal observation suggested is flattened.  He
         obtained numerical values by comparing the known position of the stars with
         the apparent bisections by visible stars of the angle between the horizon and
         _________________________
         40.  Georges Louis Leclerc, comte de Buffon, on after images, _M_e_m_o_i_r_e_s _d_e
         _m_a_t_h’_e_m_a_t_i_q_u_e _e_t _d_e _p_h_y_s_i_q_u_e, _6_0, Paris, 1743, p. 147-158.  John Dalton, "Ex-
         traordinary Facts Relating to the Vision of Colours: with Observations,"
         _M_e_m_o_i_r_s _a_n_d _P_r_o_c_e_e_d_i_n_g_s _o_f _t_h_e _L_i_t_e_r_a_r_y _a_n_d _P_h_i_l_o_s_o_p_h_i_c_a_l _S_o_c_i_e_t_y _o_f _M_a_n-
         _c_h_e_s_t_e_r, _5, 1798, p. 28-45.
         41.  Patrick D’Arcy, "Memoire sur la dur’ee de la sensation de la vue,"
         _M_e_m_o_i_r_e_s _d_e _m_a_t_h’_e_m_a_t_i_q_u_e _e_t _d_e _p_h_y_s_i_q_u_e, _8_2, Paris, 1765, p. 439-451.
         42.  Pierre Bouger, "Recherche sur la grandeur apparente des objets,"
         _M_e_m_o_i_r_e_s _d_e _m_a_t_h’_e_m_a_t_i_q_u_e _e_t _d_e _p_h_y_s_i_q_u_e, _7_2, Paris, 1755, p. 99-112.
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         straight overhead.43
              The practice of seeking precise measurements in testing theories of per-
         ception became more common in the nineteenth century, and was particularly
         highly developed in German sensory physiology and psychology.  Wundt and
         Helmholtz drew upon earlier work when they brought sensory psychology into a
         position of scientific prominence, and not solely with respect to experiment;
         equally or more importantly, their theoretical conceptions were inherited from
         the highly developed theories of spatial perception that arose in the
         eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.44
         Conclusions
              Psychology or the science of the mind was conceived as a natural science
         in the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries all three.  The
         notions of _p_s_y_c_h_o_l_o_g_y and _n_a_t_u_r_a_l _s_c_i_e_n_c_e underwent significant change along
         the way.  At first "psychology" was the science of the Aristotelian soul, and
         covered vegetative as well as sensory and intellectual powers; study of the
         latter, "cognitive" powers was a (dominating) subdiscipline in Aristotelian
         psychology.  Wolffians made psychology a part of metaphysics, coordinate with
         cosmology.  Scots placed psychology within moral philosophy, but distinguished
         its "physical" laws from properly moral laws (for guiding conduct).  Several
         Germans sought to establish an autonomous empirical psychology.  Meanwhile,
         British and French visual theorists developed sophisticated theories of spa-
         tial perception and mathematically precise theories of size and distance per-
         _________________________
         43.  Robert Smith, _C_o_m_p_l_e_a_t _S_y_s_t_e_m _o_f _O_p_t_i_c_k_s, Cambridge, 1738, 2 vols.,
         vol. 1, p. 63-66.  All three examples, along with others, are reported in
         Joseph Priestley, _H_i_s_t_o_r_y _a_n_d _P_r_e_s_e_n_t _S_t_a_t_e _o_f _D_i_s_c_o_v_e_r_i_e_s _R_e_l_a_t_i_n_g _t_o _V_i-
         _s_i_o_n, _L_i_g_h_t, _a_n_d _C_o_l_o_u_r_s, London, 1772.
         44.  Gary Hatfield, _T_h_e _N_a_t_u_r_a_l _a_n_d _t_h_e _N_o_r_m_a_t_i_v_e: _T_h_e_o_r_i_e_s _o_f _S_p_a_t_i_a_l _P_e_r-
         _c_e_p_t_i_o_n _f_r_o_m _K_a_n_t _t_o _H_e_l_m_h_o_l_t_z, Cambridge, Mass., The MIT Press, 1990, ch.
         2, 4, 5.
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         ception; they created instruments to test these theories, and to measure other
         visual phenomena, such as the duration of visual impressions.  Nearly all of
         these investigators were dualists of one sort or another.  From early to late,
         the trend was to bracket metaphysical questions in favor of the search for
         empirical regularities and empirically-based systems of classification.  These
         empirical studies were directed at mental phenomena considered as distinct
         from material phenomena.
              This sketch of the early history of psychology challenges not only the
         usual historiography, but also the usual conception of Enlightenment progress.
         In the standard narrative, the heroes of the Enlightenment are materialists.
         If psychology is to be made a science, the story goes, mind must be equated
         with matter and thereby rendered subject to empirical investigation.45  The
         problem is that no one bothered to tell the early practitioners of natural
         scientific psychology that they had to be materialists in order to be natural
         scientific psychologists.  In point of fact, of all the major eighteenth cen-
         tury authors who made contributions to the development of psychology, only
         Erasmus Darwin allowed that mind might be material; nineteenth-century found-
         ers of psychology, including Wundt, Helmholtz, Lotze, Ebbinghaus, James, Mun-
         sterburg, and Binet, banished the very question from scientific psychology.46
         These authors conceived psychology as natural scientific without seeing the
         need to adopt the metaphysical position of materialism.  In so doing, they
         would seem to be proceeding quite rationally, by studying what can be studied
         _________________________
         45.  Schaffer makes this position explicit in "States of Mind," p. 240, 263.
         46.  Erasmus Darwin, _Z_o_o_n_o_m_i_a, _o_r _t_h_e _L_a_w_s _o_f _O_r_g_a_n_i_c _L_i_f_e, London, 1794, 2
         vols., vol. 1, p. 108-109.  On anti- and non-materialistic stances in
         eighteenth and nineteenth century psychology (including Wundt, Helmholtz,
         and Lotze), see my _T_h_e _N_a_t_u_r_a_l _a_n_d _t_h_e _N_o_r_m_a_t_i_v_e, ch. 6-7.  James, _P_s_y_c_h_o_l_o-
         _g_y, p. 6-7.  Hugo Munsterberg, _P_s_y_c_h_o_l_o_g_y: _G_e_n_e_r_a_l _a_n_d _A_p_p_l_i_e_d, New
         York/London, 1914, p. 39-42.  Alfred Binet, _I_n_t_r_o_d_u_c_t_i_o_n ‘_a _l_a _p_s_y_c_h_o_l_o_g_i_e
         _e_x_p’_e_r_i_m_e_n_t_a_l_e, Paris, 1894, p. 146.
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         on its own terms and avoiding an unnecessary commitment to the unsupported
         claim that mental phenomena can be reduced to material processes.  The old
         equation of Enlightenment Reason with materialism turns out to have been so
         much prejudice.  It would be interesting to discover the historical conditions
         in which this version of history became entrenched.  In the meantime, there is
         much work to be done investigating the history of psychology considered as the
         science of mental phenomena, a history in which faculty psychology is no joke,
         and in which materialism is virtually nowhere to be found.
